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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
BONNIE L. RANDALL, for-
merly BONNIE L. BRICKER, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
Case No. 16230 
DANNY E. BRICKER, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action by Plaintiff-Respondent, hereinafter 
referred to as Respondent, to renew a judgment that was entered 
on February 26, 1970. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Both Respondent and Appellant moved for summary judg-
ment and the lower court granted Respondent's motion and denied 
the motion of Appellant, reasoning that Aee~llant's absenc~ 
from the State of Utah tolled the runnin<J of the statute ,pf 
---·- -·····--~ ., ... 
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limitations during his absence. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to have the judgment of the lower 
court affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent was divorced from Appellant by decree 
entered by the First Judicial District court of Box Elder 
County, State of Utah, on the 11th day of June, 1968. R~: 
was awarded the care and custody of the two ( 2) minor ch~.l~~.en 
of the parties, and Appellant was ordered to pay to Respondent 
One Dollar ($1.00) per year alimony and One Hundred Dollars 
~----~~--~~-----~· ($100.00) per month child support. (R. 33.) 
On the 26th day of F~bJ:yar~- lll.P, judgment was 
~......... ~ ............... 
entered against Appellant and in favor of Respondent in the 
amount of Two Thousand one Hundred Fifty Dollars ($2, 150. 00) 
for arrearages in support payments and Seventy-Five Dollars 
($75.00) for attorney's fees. (R.8, 29.) Nithin eight (8) 
years prior to the commencement of this action, the attorney's 
fees were paid but no other sums or amounts whatsoever were 
paid on said judgment. (R.8, 33.) 
On the 30th day of June, 1978, this action was com~ 
.. µ~--
-------·--
menced for the purpose of renewing said judgment. (R.2.) 
-
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Between the date of entry of said judgment and the date 
this action was commenced, Appellant resided in the State 
'£ 
of North Carolina for a period in excess of 9~e _ C.ll year. 
(R.9, 20, 27.) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT'S ABSENCE FROM THE STATE 
OF UTAH TOLLED THE RUNNING OF THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
Neither the fact that approximately eight years and 
four months elapsed between the entry of the February 26, 1970, 
judgment and the commencement of this action nor the fact 
that Appellant was absent from the State of Utah for more 
than twelve months during said period of time is in dispute. 
The issue to be resolved is whether Appellant's absence 
from the State of Utah tolled the running of the statute of 
limitations. 
Section 78-12-22, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides 
with respect to a suit on a judgment: 
Within eight years: An action upon a judgment 
or decree of any court of the United States, 
or any state or territory within the United 
States .... An action to enforce any liabil-
ity due or to become due, for failure to 
provide support or maintenance for dependent 
children. 
- 3 -
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However, Section 78-12-35 provides: 
If when a cause of action accrues against 
a person when he is out of the state, the 
action may be conunenced within the term 
herein limited after his return to the 
state; and if after a cause of action 
accrues he departs from the state, the 
time of his absence is not part of the time 
limited for the conunencement of the action. 
(Emphasis added) 
It is evident from reading the foregoing sections 
that the legislature did not intend that a Plaintiff be deprived 
of his or her cause of action because a potential defendant 
would absent himself from the State. That policy was first 
judicially enunciated in the State of Utah in Keith o. Brien 
Co. v. Snyder, 51 Utah 227, 169 Pac. 954 (1917). In that case, 
the defendant had absented himself from the State for five and 
one-half years after the cause of action accrued. Notwith-
standing the fact that defendant's family had remained in 
the State of Utah during that period of time and, therefore, 
process could have been served upon them, the court said at 
page 956: 
Indeed, the authorities that hold that absence 
from the State tolls the Statute all agree 
that the statute runs only during the time the 
debtor is openly in the State, and immediately 
on his leaving it, the statute again ceases to 
run until his return, and that in computing 
time, all the period of absence must be con-
sidered and added together. 
- 4 -
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This Court reaffirmed the Keith o. Brien doctrine 
in the case of Buell v. Duchesne Mercantile Co., 64 Utah 391, 
231 Pac. 123 (1924). There, plaintiff sued defendant on a 
prior judgment. During the running of the Statute of 
Limitations, the defendant personally had been absent from 
the State but had maintained a home within the State. This 
Court held that his absence from the State was sufficient 
to toll the statute. 
Respondent relies ~-:.rily _<;>.~.-~~~.~~~~Snyder 
---~----···\...·•'-"'·- ...... 
v. Clune, 15 Utah 2d 254, 390 P.2d 915, (1964). The facts 
of that case are clearly distinguishable from the case at 
~---~--
bar. In that case, plaintiff was in~1:!:._~d in an automobile 
~------
accident by a negligent defendant who left the State of Utah, 
returning to his home in California, after the accident. 
After the Statute of Limitations had run, plaintiff brought 
- - - ... ---~--•.--.:.- .... ,_. __ ..,-,.,..~r::.....-ar,.,,.,_~.._.._ ~, ... ~,.~ 
suit in Utah claiming that the statute had been ~olled by 
,, ... , _,,.,,,,_C,o•~ ..... ~.:>.l~ ..... f'-" 0''""''-~~ .... ~~l...i.~~ gr 
defendant's absence from the State. This Court held that 
defendant's absence did not toll the running of the statute, 
and thus, the action was barred. However, the basis of that 
decision was the fact that even though the defendant was 
..._ _____ ' ----- .. 
absent from the State, he was subject to service of process 
by virtue of Section 41-12-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
in that he had appointed the se:7.~_1:~~X~ ~:-.s~~te_~:,_12_~~-~~:~t 
- 5 -
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for that purpose. Citing those facts and the applicable 
statute, this Court stated at page 916: 
The defendants thus had an agent within 
the State upon whom process could have 
been served for them, and they were not 
"absent" from the State in the sense 
contemplated by the statute, that is, 
unavailable for the service of process. 
Therefore, the plaintiff was not pre-
vented from commencin her action at 
any time she desired. Emphasis added) 
In the instant case, the Appellant appointed no 
agent for service of process, nor was his family within the 
State, nor was Appellant amenable to process on the judgment. 
In each case cited by Appellant in his brief, the defendant 
remained subject to the jurisdiction of the court either 
by means of an agent within the state upon whom process 
could be served, or the state's long-arm statue. In the 
instant case, neither means was at Respondent's disposal to 
effectuate service on Appellant. Thus, the cases cited by 
Defendant are inapplicable to the case at bar and are not 
controlling. 
POINT II 
WITH RESPECT TO ACTION ON THE 1970 
JUDGMENT, APPELLANT WAS NOT SUBJECT 
TO THE JURISDICTION OF UTAH'S COURTS 
DURING THE TIME HE WAS ABSENT FROM 
THE STATE. 
5 Utah Code Annotatei Appellant relies on Section 30-2- , 
1953, as amended, which provides in relevant part: 
- 6 -
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ec. 
. . . The court shall have continuing juris-
diction to make such subsequent changes or new 
orders with respect to the support and main-
tenance of the parties, the custody of the 
children and their support and maintenance, 
or the distribution of the property as shall 
be reasonable and necessary .... 
He contends that since the court~ich granted ~~~e 
maintained continuing jurisdiction with respect to support 
-~ .. -~·,,-" -- .- ' -- "• 
and maintenance, the action on the 1970 jud<a;ment coy~ve 
been commenced and process served on Appellant while he was 
_,,., __ .....,,,.,_,_ ·-·,-,·>(;..-'~><>~·'·' .. ''" ~-,. • .---...,..... ____ ....., __ _ 
____ ,_..........._.,.,.,........-""'- .,....:J<,..,,, .,.,-
absent from the State and, thus, there was no rea~r 
.... -·. 1'.:• - ........ ,J.1'(.it"'~--.. ~·"~ ., ,.,._,.. ________ • ..-.. 
the running of the statute of limitations to be tolled. 
However, Appellant ignores the fact that once a judgment 
for arrearages in support payments is entered, the support 
obligation merges into the judgment which becomes like any 
other judgment and the nature of 'the indebtedness is lost. 
In Yergensen v. Ford, 16 Utah 2d 397, 402 P.2d 
696, the plaintiff sued to renew a judgment which had been 
rendered more than eight years before the commencement of 
the action. The judgment had been rendered in an action on 
three promissory notes. After the entry of the judgment, the 
judgment debtors, in order to secure a lien release, entered 
into a written agreement acknowledging the obligation and 
thereafter made payments totaling $450.00. The last payment 
was made within eight years before the commencement of the 
- 7 -
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action on the judgment. Plaintiff argued that since there had 
been part payment the statute of limitations had been tolled 
to the date of the last payment. The court rejected that 
argument noting that the running of the statute would be 
tolled by part payment only in cases founded on contract. 
This Court in affirming the judgment of the lower court 
stated at page 697 of its opinion: 
It is next argued by plaintiff that the 
phrase, "In any case founded on contract," 
contained in 78-12-44 includes the judg-
ment in the instant action because it was 
founded upon the promissory notes. In 
effect, the plaintiff claims that the debt 
(contract) upon which his judgment was 
rendered is revived so that it retains its 
original character and thus falls within the 
tolling provisions of 78-12-44. 
This argument is without merit, for when a 
valid and final 'ud ent for the pa ment of 
money is rendered, the origina claim is 
extinguished, and a new cause of action on 
the judgment is substituted for it. In 
such case, the original claim loses its 
character and identity and is mer ed in the 
judgment. Emphasis added) 
In Beesley v. Badger, 66 Utah 194, 240 Pac. 458 (19251 
this court stated at page 460: 
By the weight of authority, and as we think 
the better reason, although there are cases 
to the contrary, a decree for alimony in a 
gross sum as well as to past due and unpaid 
installments stands upon the same footing as 
ordinary monei judgments and may be en~orced 
by execution in the same manner as ordinary 
- 8 -
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money judgments may be enforced. 
(Emphasis added) 
Since a judgment for support money stands on the same 
footing as an ordinary judgment, like any other judgment, 
there are only two legal proceedings to enforce it: (1) a 
suit on the judgment; or (2) some form of proceeding in exe-
cution for collection. (Yergensen, supra.) The nature of 
the original claim for arrearages in support payments having 
been lost by being merged into the judgment, the domestic 
court lost its continuing jurisdiction over the claim, but 
retained jurisdiction with respect to support and maintenance 
obligations accruing after entry of the judgment. 
Appellant next argues that he remained subject to 
the courts continuing jurisdiction under Utah's long-arm 
statute. Section 78-27-24 Utah Gode Annotated, 1953, 
provides in relevant part: 
Any person ... whether or not a citizen 
or resident of this State who . . . does 
any of the following enumerated acts, sub-
mits himself to the jurisdiction of the 
courts of this state as to any claim arising 
from: 
* * * 
(6) with respect to actions of divorce and 
separate maintenance, the maintenance in 
this state of a martimonial domicile at the 
time the claim arose or the commission in 
this state of the act giving rise to the 
claim. (Emphasis added) 
- 9 -
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This is neither an action for divorce nor separate maintenance, 
but is an action on a judgment. The claim for support monies 
arising out of the decree of divorce merged into the judgment 
and the original nature of the claim was lost. (Yergensen 
and Beesley, supra.) The long-arm statute was, therefore, 
inapplicable to this action. This view is supported by 
Section 78-27-26, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, which 
provides: 
Only claims arising from acts enumerated herein 
may be asserted against a defendant in an action 
in which jurisdiction over him is based upon 
this act. (long-arm statute.) 
Since there is no provision in said act for an action to renew 
a judgment, the Utah courts could not have exercised personal 
jurisdiction over the Appellant, in this action, while he was 
absent from the State. 
Appellant argues that once the courts of this State 
obtain jurisdiction, they continue to maintain that jurisdictio:, 
However, in Gass v. Hunting, 561 P.2d 1071 (Utah 1977), the 
plaintiff filed an action to renew an old judgment. The 
judgment debtor had left the State of Utah after the rendition 
of the judgment. This issue in that case was: "Is the Statute 
of Limitations tolled while the judgment debtors are not within 
this State?" This Court answered that question affirmatively 
- 10 -
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--
holding that 11 A suit on a judgment may be commenced during the 
eight-year period following the entry thereof, and an absence 
from the State tolls the eight-year period. 11 
emphasis added) 
(Gass at 1072; 
While not addressing the issue directly in that 
case, this Court recognized the legal principle that once 
a judgment has been entered, the court no longer has juris-
diction based on the original claim. Otherwise, the court 
could have asserted that jurisdiction in the subsequent 
action and there would have been no need to toll the running 
of the Statute of Limitations. 
Additionally, while no Utah case has interpreted 
Utah's long-arm statute cited above, the subject was treated 
in the Utah Law Review, Vol. 1970, April, No. 2 at page 242 
as follows: 
Thus, an abandoned wife may obtain personal 
jurisdiction over her deserting spouse and 
sue in Utah for separate maintenance or 
alimony incidental to a divorce action. 
Inconvenience still remains, however, in 
that she ma have to sue on her Utah 'ud -
ment in a foreign forum. Emphasis added) 
Finally, Appellant argues that each of the support 
installments became a final judgment as soon as it became due. 
While it may be true that it is final in the sense that it 
could not thereafter be modified, it is not final in the sense 
- 11 -
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that execution will issue on the unpaid amounts. For exe~ 
cution to issue, the amount of the arrearages must be deter-
mined and a judgment entered for that amount. Then, and 
only then, is it a final judgment for all purposes. And 
it is from that date that the Statute of Limitations begins 
to run. 
CONCLUSION 
With respect to the 1970 judgment, Appellant was 
not subject to the jurisdiction of Utah's Courts while he was 
absent from the State. His absence, therefore, tolled the 
running of the statute of limitations. That being the case, 
the judgment of the lower court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this lJi:ti.day of June, 1979. 
~_gdJL ObertF.Orton 
David S. Walsh 
MARSDEN, ORTON & LILJENQUIST 
Attorneys for Respondent 
- 12 -
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